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Equity in Maritime Boundary
Delimitations: The Gulf of Maine Case
By INA RAILEANU*
Member of the Class of 1991
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 12, 1984, an ad hoc chamber of the International
Court of Justice (the Court) delivered its opinion in the Case Concerning
the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area.'
The decision had been anxiously awaited as the first attempt in the his-
tory of the Court to effect a line of delimitation for both the continental
shelf and the exclusive economic zone.2 Previously, disputes among
neighboring coastal states had involved delimitation of the continental
shelf alone.' However, after 1971 coastal states began extending their
200 mile exclusive fishery zones pursuant to the provisions of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.' In many instances,
such extensions gave rise to areas of significant overlap and, conse-
* B.A., University of California, Irvine, 1988.
1. Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary In the Gulf of Maine
Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.CJ. 246 (Judgment of Oct. 12), reprinted in 23 LL.M. 1197 (1984)
[hereinafter Gulf of Maine Case].
2. The concept of exclusive economic zone was developed at the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS I], U.N. Doc. A/CONF./62/Rev.l, Annex II
(1971). Articles 55-75 of UNCLOS III establish a 200 mile zone in which a coastal state has
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing all the
living and non-living resources of the seabed, its subsoil, and superdacent waters. In addition,
the coastal state has sovereign rights with respect to all other activities undertaken for the
economic exploration and exploitation of the zone, such as the production of energy from the
water, currents, and winds. Id art. 56. The coastal state also has limited jurisdiction to estab-
lish artificial islands and structures, to perform marine scientific research, and to protect and
preserve the marine environment. Id arts. 56, para. l(b), 60 & pts. XII, XIII.
All states may exercise the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight within the
exclusive economic zone. Id art. 58, paras. 1-2. However, in exercising these freedoms, all
states must give due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal state. Id art. 58, para. 3.
3. The term "continental shelf," as defined by article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf, refers to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas "outside the
area of the territorial sea." Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 19, 1958, art. 1,
15 U.S.T. 471, 473, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 312 [hereinafter 1958 Geneva Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf].
4. See supra note 2.
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quently, to disputes over the division of those areas. The Gulf of Maine
Case was the first such dispute to be brought before the International
Court of Justice.5
The area of overlap between the fishery zones claimed by the United
States and Canada included Georges Bank, considered the most impor-
tant fishing bank off the east coast of the United States, as well as a rich
source of mineral deposits. The average estimates, of recoverable hydro-
carbon deposits on Georges Bank are 0.9 billion barrels of oil and 4.4
trillion cubic feet of natural gas.6 The value of the fisheries of Georges
Bank over the next 20 years is estimated at 3.34 billion dollars.7 Under
the "equitable result" the Court purportedly reached in its four to one
decision, the United States and Canada now share these mineral and liv-
ing resources. For the United States, to whom Georges Bank was "as
American as apple pie,"' the acquisition of anything less than full juris-
diction over the Bank meant defeat.9 On the other hand, for Canada,
"any boundary that put [Canada] palpably on the Bank" was a victory. 10
Indeed, although Canada acquired jurisdiction only over approximately
one-sixth of the Bank, 1 it acquired substantial new ground and fish re-
sources, while the majority of its existing scallop fishery remained
protected. 12
5. Since the Gulf of Maine Case, only one case involving delimitation of both continental
shelf and exclusive economic zone has been decided. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
Between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau (Guinea v. Guinea-Bissau), Court of Arbitration (Award
of Feb. 1985), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 252 (1986) [hereinafter Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Arbitra-
tion]. The Court of Arbitration was asked to delimit by means of a single line the territorial
sea, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf in the portion of the Atlantic Ocean be-
tween Guinea and Guinea-Bissau.
6. Comment, Maritime Delimitation and the Gulf of Maine Case: A Guide for the Future
or Merely Slicing the Pie?, 12 S. ILL. U.L.J. 599, 605 n.37 [hereinafter Comment, Maritime
Delimitation] (quoting Rhee, Equitable Solutions to the Maritime Boundary Dispute Between
the United States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 592 (1981)).
7. Id at 606 n.37.
8. Clain, Gulf of Maine-A Disappointing First in the Delimitation of a Single Maritine
Boundary, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 521, 544 (1985).
9. Schneider, The Gulf of Maine Case: The Nature of an Equitable Result, 79 AM. J.
INT'L L. 539, 541 (1985). A front page headline in the Washington Post declared: "World
Court Bars U.S. Claim to Ocean Bank." The New York Time. stated: "U.S. Fish Harvest
Held Hurt by Court Boundary Decision." Id. at 540 (citing Wash. Post, Oct. 13, 1984, at Al,
col. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1984, § 1, at 38, col. 1).
10. IdL
11. Id at 539.
12. Previously, American and Canadian fishermen had enjoyed free access to all the areas
of the Bank. Comment, Maritime Delimitations, supra note 6, at 635 n.248. However, as a
result of the Court's decision, Canada acquired "as much as 9000 square nautical miles of the
most lucrative part of Georges Bank." Clain, supra note 8, at 606. Thus, Canada gained an
additional 30% of the haddock harvest, 25% of the pollack harvest, and 20% of the redfish
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This Note will discuss the equity of this result by sketching the ge-
ography of the area in controversy, the history of the dispute, and the
legal background of continental shelf delimitation. Next, the Note will
trace the Chamber's process of delimiting the maritime boundary in the
Gulf of Maine area. The discussion will then focus on the delimitation of
the second segment of the boundary, with emphasis on the role played by
the principle of proportionality. In particular, the Note will criticize the
interpretation and application of that principle by the United States, the
Chamber, and by Judge Schwebel's concurring opinion in terms of its
consistency with previous decisions concerning maritime boundary de-
limitations. The Note will conclude by suggesting a proportionality
formula the Chamber could have used in the GulfofMaine Case to reach
a more equitable result and that can guide the Court in future delimita-
tions of deep coastal concavities similar to the Gulf of Maine.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Geography and Geomorphology of the Gulf of Maine Area 3
The Gulf of Maine encompasses an area of approximately 36,000
square miles roughly in the shape of an "elongated rectangle."1 4 It is
bordered on three sides by land, primarily that of the United States. The
western side of the rectangle is an imaginary line running from Nan-
tucket Island past the contiguous bays of Cape Cod and Massachusetts to
the tip of Cape Ann. The northern side of the rectangle-the first of its
long sides-runs from Cape Elizabeth along the coast of Maine to the
international boundary line between the United States and Canada,
which terminates in the Grand Manan Channel. "5 The Bay of Fundy lies
at the northern tip of the Gulf, between the opposing coasts of New
Brunswick and Nova Scotia. The eastern side of the rectangle links the
Grand Manan Channel to Cape Sable at the southwestern extremity of
Nova Scotia. On the fourth side, the gulf spills into the Atlantic Ocean.
Thus, the second long side of the rectangle is an imaginary line running
across the waters from Nantucket Island to Cape Sable. Georges Bank,
and yellowtail flounder harvest, id, as well as exclusive jurisdiction over the part of Georges
Bank containing "the greatest concentrations of scallops." Collins & Rogofi, The Gulf of
Maine Case and the Future of Ocean Boundary Delimitation, 38 MAINE L. REV. 1, 31 (1986).
13. The United States and Canada sharply disagreed as to the geographical and
geomorphological features to be included in defining the Gulf of Maine area. Therefore, the
following description of the area is based upon that of the Court.
14. Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 1, para. 29.
15. Id para. 30.
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the core area of the dispute, lies seaward of the Gulf, outside its closing
lines, but well within the delimitation area.
The continental shelf in the Gulf of Maine area is a part of the
North American Atlantic continental margin, which extends from New-
foundland to Florida.16 It forms a single "continuous, uniform and unin-
terrupted" geological and geomorphological17 structure throughout its
length.18 The great volume of water within the delimitation area pos-
sesses the same character of unity and uniformity as the continental shelf
beneath it.19 (See Appendix 1.)
B. History of the Dispute
The dispute over the continental shelf in the Gulf of Maine area
dates back to September 28, 1945, when President Harry S. Truman is-
sued the Proclamation Relating to the Continental Shelf (the Truman
Proclamation).20 The Truman Proclamation established exclusive U.S.
jurisdiction over "the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the
Continental Shelf beneath the high seas.., contiguous" to its coasts.21
Pursuant to this proclamation, the United States established a 100-
fathom depth line as the boundary of its continental shelf zone-a
boundary which included Georges Bank.22
16. Id. para. 45; Memorial of the United States (Can. v. U.S.), 1982 I.C.J. Pleadings (Gulf
of Maine) para. 30 (Sept. 27, 1982) [hereinafter U.S. Memorial].
17. Geomorphology is the study of the shape of the sea floor. U.S. Memorial, supra note
16, para. 30.
18. Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 1, para. 45. The Court thus specifically disallowed the
U.S. contention that the Northeast Channel constitutes a significant break in the surface of the
continental shelf capable of serving as the basis for drawing a single line of delimitation in the
Gulf of Maine area. U.S. Memorial, supra note 16, para. 296. Rather, the Court held that it
had "no choice but to proceed without reference to any real factor of natural separation of the
continental shelf of the two countries, because no such factors are discernible." Gulf of Malne
Case, supra note 1, para. 47.
19. Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 1, para. 55.
20. The Truman Proclamation, Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States with
Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and the Seabed of the Continental Shelf, Sept,
28, 1945, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945), reprinted in 13 DEP'T ST. BULL. 485 (1945).
21. U.S. Memorial, supra note 16, para. 134.
22. Id. The United States later insisted that Canadian claims to part of Georges Bank
were precluded by its acquiescence in the U.S. assertion of jurisdiction over the 100 fathom
depth contour in the Gulf of Maine area. The United States maintained that consent could be
implied from Canada's failure to react to the Truman proclamation and to the Department of
State communique that accompanied the Proclamation, which clearly indicated that U.S. juris-
diction extended to the 100 fathom depth. Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 1, para. 153. The
Court rejected the U.S. estoppel argument based on the principle established in the North Sea
Continental ShelfCases (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 1 (Judgment of Feb.
20), that delimitation must be effected by agreement. Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 1, paras.
[Vol. 14
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The dispute began to take shape in 1964 when Canada granted per-
mits for oil and gas exploration in the northeastern portion of Georges
Bank.3 Canada's action prompted diplomatic consultations between the
United States and Canada during which the two governments sought to
agree on a -continental shelf boundary in the Gulf of Maine area. On
November 5, 1969, after unsuccessful attempts to reach an agreement,
the U.S. Department of State requested a moratorium on mineral explo-
ration and exploitation on Georges Bank.24 The Canadian Government
rejected the U.S. request for a moratorium.' On February 21, 1970, the
United States officially condemned the issuance of Canadian permits au-
thorizing the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources in the
area of the Georges Bank.26
In 1977 the dispute took on a new dimension as both nations ex-
tended their fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles offshore based on the pro-
visions of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Seas.27
(See Appendix 1.) This concurrent expansion of fishery zones resulted in
an area of overlap covering approximately 210 square nautical miles,2"
including all of Georges Bank.29 Georges Bank is "one of the richest
fishing grounds in the world,"30 producing about twice as much as the
North Sea and five times as much as the northeast Arctic.3" Control over
the living and the mineral resources of the Georges Bank was now at
stake. The dispute, which had previously been confined to the continental
shelf boundary issue, became magnified by the need to address the over-
lapping U.S. and Canadian claims to a 200-mile exclusive fishery zone.
Intensive negotiations, carried on by special negotiators appointed
by the Prime Minister of Canada and the U.S. President, failed to pro-
duce an agreement on the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine
area.32 Therefore, in 1979 Canada and the United States decided to seek
adjudication of their dispute in a Chamber of the International Court of
153-154. Hence, unilateral conduct by one of the parties could not estop the claim of the
other.
23. Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 1, para. 131.
24. Id. paras. 64, 136.
25. Id para. 64.
26. Id para. 65.
27. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
28. U.S. Memorial, supra note 16, para. 151.
29. Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 1, para. 68.
30. Comment, The Gulf ofMaine Case, 1984 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 267, 268 (authored by
L.H. Legault & D.M. McRae).
31. Collins & Rogoff, supra note 12, at 2.
32. Clain, supra note 8, at 533.
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Justice.33
C. Restrictions Placed on the Chamber
The United States and Canada brought their dispute before the
Court by notification of a Special Agreement as provided in article 40,
paragraph 1 of the Statute of the Court.34 The Special Agreement pro-
vided that the delimitation of a single boundary dividing the continental
shelf and fisheries zones of Canada and the United States in the Gulf of
Maine area should be determined by a Chamber of the Court (the Cham-
ber).35 The parties expressly agreed that each would accept as final and
binding the decision of the Chamber.36 The parties annexed the Special
Agreement to the Treaty between Canada and the United States to Sub-
mit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine area.37
The Special Agreement expressly established the basic parameters
for the settlement and outlined the extent of the Court's jurisdiction.
Therefore, the Court's decision had to conform to the following provi-
sions of the Special Agreement. First, the starting point for the line of
delimitation, called point A, had to be the first point south of the interna-
tional boundary terminus at which the fishery limits claimed by the two
nations in 1977 intersect. 38 Second, the line of delimitation had to termi-
33. Treaty to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Mar. 29, 1979, United States-Canada, T.I.A.S. No.
10204, at 2797 (entered into force Nov. 20, 1980). The Maritime Boundary Treaty was accom-
panied by the Agreement on East Coast Fishery Resources, S. EXEC. Doc. No. V, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979), that provided for the permanent sharing of fishing and management of
Georges Bank by the United States and Canada. Clain, supra note 8, at 534. President Carter
submitted both treaties to the Senate with his "strong endorsement." Id. However, President
Reagan withdrew the Fisheries Agreement in March 1981 upon finding out that the Senate
would only accept the Boundary Adjudication Treaty. Id. Canada agreed to let the Boundary
Adjudication Treaty enter into force without the Fisheries Agreement. Collins & Rogoff,
supra note 12, at 5 n.19.
34. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 40, para. 1, 59 Stat. 1055,
1061, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179, 1188.
35. U.S. Memorial, supra note 16, para. 3.
36. Id. para. 4.
37. Treaty to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, supra note 33.
38. Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 1, para. 20. The coordinates for point A are 44"11'12"
north, 67"16'46" west. Id. Point A is thus situated about 40 nautical miles from the terminal
point of the international boundary terminus in the Grand Manan Channel. Schneider, supra
note 9, at 543. The reason advanced for choosing point A was the desire of the parties to
reserve for themselves the possibility of a solution to the dispute as to the sovereignty over
Machias Seal Island and North Rock, both of which lie landward of point A. U.S. Memorial,
supra note 16, at 2 n.1.
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nate within a specific area agreed upon by the parties and enclosed within
a triangle.39 (See Appendix 2.) The agreement authorized the Chamber
to terminate its delimitation "at any point in the triangle."'  Restricted
only by these few limitations on its jurisdiction, the Chamber proceeded
to comply with the request in the Special Agreement.
D. Legal History of Continental Shelf Delimitation
Although the request for the Court to delimit the 200 mile exclusive
economic zone was unprecedented, delimitation of the continental shelf
has its roots in the Court's decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases.4 The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases involved the delimitation
of the continental shelf in the North Sea, where the coastlines of Den-
mark, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany form a
deep concavity. Denmark and the Netherlands contended that article 6
of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf"2 had become
customary international law and governed the dispute. They claimed
that their boundaries with Germany were to be determined by the appli-
cation of the equidistance method enunciated in article 6 of the Conven-
tion.43 Application of that method would have resulted in cutting
Germany off from the extension of its coastal front into the North Sea.
Germany in turn contended that article 6 of the Continental Shelf Con-
vention had not become customary international law, and that the delim-
itation should be made in accordance with the principle that each coastal
state is entitled to a 'just and equitable share.",
The Court agreed with Germany that the principle of equidistance,
39. The geographic coordinates of the triangle are 40* north, 67" west; 40" north, 65*
west; 42* north, 65* west. The triangle was established in order to avoid the possibility of the
Chamber's decision in this case "prejudicing the determination of the outer edge of the conti-
nental margin or other questions arising in determining the outer limit of the 200-nautical-mile
zone." U.S. Memorial, supra note 16, at 2 n.l.
40. Ide (emphasis added).
41. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 22.
42. 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 3.
43. Article 6 states in relevant part that, in delimiting the boundaries of the continental
shelf, "[i]n the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special
circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of equidis-
tance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea or
each state is measured." Id. art. 6, 15 U.S.T. at 474,499 U.N.T.S. at 316. Robert D. Hodgson,
Director of the United States Office of the Geographer, explains an equidistant line as follows:
"Geometrically, the line that is equidistant between any two points, A and B, in the same plane
is the perpendicular bisector of the line joining the two points .... ." Hodgson & Cooper, The
Technical Delimitation of a Modern Equidistant Boundary, 3 OcEAN DEV. & INT'L LJ. 361,
364 (1976).
44. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 22, para. 15.
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as codified by article 6 of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, did not
represent a binding rule of customary international law.45 In addition,
the Court held that the principle of equidistance is only one possible eq-
uitable criterion to be used in the delimitation of the continental shelf.
46
When a case presents circumstances such that application of the equidis-
tance principle would create an inequitable result, the Court held that
"there is no legal limit to the considerations which States may take ac-
count of for the purpose of making sure that they apply equitable proce-
dures."'47 To achieve an equitable solution, the parties must balance a
variety of considerations which "vary with the circumstances of each
case."4 Applying its holding to the facts immediately before it, the
Court adopted an equitable method of delimitation that gave due effect to
Germany's natural prolongation49 from its land..territory out into the
open water of the North Sea, rather than the equidistance method articu-
lated in the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention."° Besides the principle
of natural prolongation, the court identified a number of other criteria
that states might take into consideration in reaching equitable solutions
to future continental shelf delimitations. Such criteria included the geo-
logical and geographical aspects of a particular situation, the unity of
deposits on the ocean floor, and the proportionality between the extent of
the continental shelf appertaining to the states concerned and the length
of their respective coastlines.51
The application of these criteria was left open to the circumstances
45. The Court noted that in order for a particular provision of a convention to become a
rule of customary international law, "the provision concerned should... be of a fundamen-
tally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule
of law." Ide para. 72. The Court announced four main reasons why the principle of equldis.
tance did not meet this requirement.
First of all, article 6 requires that states first attempt to effect delimitation of the continen-
tal shelf by agreement. The principle of equidistance should be applied only in the absence of
an agreement. Thus, the obligation to use the method of equidistance is of a secondary, rather
than a primary, nature. Ide As such, it would constitute "an unusual preface to what is
claimed to be a potential general rule of law." Id. Second, the effect of the notion of special
circumstances on the principle of equidistance is too controvertol to allow article 6 to become
a "norm-creating" rule. Id Third, the ability of states to make reservations to article 6 denies
to the provisions of that article a norm-creating character. Id. Finally, the Court noted that
states had not invoked article 6 extensively enough or "in such a way as to show a general
recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved." -d. paras. 74-75.
46. Id para. 90.
47. Id. para. 93.
48. Id.
49. Natural prolongation "refers to the physical extension of the land territory of a State
into and under the sea." U.S. Memorial, supra note 16, para. 2.45.
50. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 22, at 53, 101.
51. Id. paras. 94-98.
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of each case. Disputing coastal states therefore disagreed as to their ap-
plication and were unable to reach agreement without court adjudica-
tion. In the cases that followed the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,
namely the Anglo French Continental Shelf delimitation of 197752 and
the Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf Case of 1982,13 the Court made fur-
ther efforts to elaborate on the application of the equitable criteria it had
announced in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.
In 1975 the United Kingdom and France agreed to submit their dis-
pute concerning the delimitation of their respective continental shelves in
the English Channel and an area of the Atlantic Ocean immediately west
of the Channel to an arbitral tribunal.' The Court of Arbitration was
asked to decide the controversy "in accordance with the rules of interna-
tional law applicable in the matter as between the parties."" In perform-
ing this task, the Court of Arbitration focused on "the link between
proportionality and the principle that delimitation is to be effected in
accordance with equitable principles, taking account of the relevant cir-
cumstances, to produce an equitable result." 6
The Court of Arbitration did not view proportionality as an in-
dependent source of a coastal state's right to the continental shelf in front
of it. Rather, it considered proportionality as only one factor to be used
in evaluating the equities of certain geographical aberrations. The Court
of Arbitration noted the following geographical aberration in the area of
delimitation: the island of Ushant forms part of the land mass of France
and lies ten nautical miles from the French coast within the territorial
sea of the French mainland. 7 The Scilly Isles likewise form part of the
land mass of England and lie twenty-one nautical miles from the British
coast within the territorial sea of the British mainland."' The distance
that the Scilly Isles extend the coastline of the mainland of the United
Kingdom westward onto the Atlantic continental shelf is thus slightly
more than twice the distance that Ushant Island extends the coastline of
the French mainland. 9 Hence, giving full effect to the Scilly Isles as a
52. Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (U.K. v. Fr.), 18 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 3 (Deci-
sions of June 30, 1977, and Mar. 14, 1978), reprinted in 18 LL.M. 397 (1979) [hereinafter
Anglo/French Arbitration].
53. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tun. v. Lib. Arab. Jamahiriya), 1982 I.CJ. 18
(Judgment of Feb. 24), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 225 (1982) [hereinafter Tunisia/Libya Case].
54. Anglo/French Arbitration, supra note 52, paras. 1-2.
55. Id at para. 1.
56. U.S. Memorial, supra note 16, para. 223.
57. Anglo/French Arbitration, supra note 52, para. 248.
58. I1
59. Id par. 251.
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base-point for determining the course of the boundary would have had a
disproportionate and therefore inequitable effect. To abate the potential
inequity created by the Scilly Isles, the Court of Arbitration devised the
equitable method of giving islands half-effect. That method operates as
follows:
The method of giving half-effect consists in delimiting the line equidis-
tant between the two coasts, first, without the use of the offshore island
as a base-point and, secondly, with its use as a base-point; a boundary
giving half-effect to the island is then the line drawn midway between
those two equidistance lines. 60
In drawing the delimitation line according to this method, the Court of
Arbitration was not concerned with the resulting ratio of continental
shelf to coastline. Rather, the Court was satisfied that by giving half-
effect to the Scilly Isles, it had remedied the disproportionate effect of
their exceptionally long protrusion.
The Tunisia/Libya Case was brought before the Court by means of
a Special Agreement between Tunisia and Libya. The case concerned the
delimitation of an area of the continental shelf beneath the Mediterra-
nean Sea off the coasts of these states. The Court was asked to state
"[w]hat principles and rules of international law may be applied for the
delimitation of the area of the continental shelf" at issue and further to
"clarify the practical method for the application of these principles and
rules ...."61 The Court held that it was "bound to apply equitable
principles as part of international law, and to balance up the various con-
siderations which it regards as relevant to produce an equitable result."'62
The Court's opinion focused on the equitable principles of natural pro-
longation and proportionality.
The principle of natural prolongation constituted the crux of Libya's
argument. Libya claimed that the Tripolitanian Furrow in the continen-
tal shelf of the delimitation area constituted a natural prolongation of the
territory of both parties and interrupted the continuity of the continental
shelf in the area of delimitation "so as to amount to a 'natural submarine
frontier.' "63 Accordingly, Libya suggested that the line of delimitation
follow the northward direction of that natural p:rolongation."
In addressing this argument, the Court held that the natural prolon-
gation principle was relevant to maritime delimitations only in situations
60. Id.
61. Tunisia/Libya Case, supra note 53, para. 4.
62. Id para. 71.
63. Id. para. 80.
64. Id para. 113.
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where the prolongation creates "such a marked disruption or discontinu-
ance of the sea-bed as to constitute an indisputable indication of the lim-
its of two separate continental shelves." 6 However, the Court qualified
this seemingly rigid rule by adding that even if the natural prolongation
"does not contain any element which interrupts the continuity of the
continental shelf," it may still be considered as a relevant circumstance in
determining an equitable solution." Turning to the situation at hand,
the Court concluded that the Tripolitanian Furrow did not sufficiently
disrupt the "essential unity of the continental shelf" as to merit "inclu-
sion among the factors to be balanced up with a view to equitable
delimitation."'67
The Court in the Tunisia/Libya Case made use of the principle of
proportionality both as applied in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
and in the Anglo/French Arbitration. Thus, the Court used the principle
of proportionality both as a means of ensuring that the area of continen-
tal shelf allotted to each state was proportional to the length of that
state's coastline, and as a means of giving islands half-effect.
In accordance with the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Libya
and Tunisia agreed that the line of delimitation should take into account
"a reasonable degree of proportionality... between the extent of the
continental shelf areas appertaining to the coastal State and the length of
its coast measured in the general direction of the coastline."' 68 The par-
ties disagreed as to which coasts were to be taken into account. 69
In particular, the dispute concerned the inclusion of the coasts of
the Gulf of Gabes for purposes of the proportionality test. The Gulf of
Gabes is an indentation in the Tunisian coastline which creates a radical
change in the direction of the coast. This circumstance would have ne-
cessitated adjusting the delimitation line in favor of Libya. Therefore,
Tunisia reasoned that since the waters of the Gulf of Gabes were internal
waters,7" the coasts and the waters of the gulf had to be excluded from
any proportionality calculations.71 Libya, on the other hand, maintained
65. Id para. 66.
66. Id para. 68.
67. Id para. 80.
68. IL para. 103 (citing North Sea Continental ShelfCases, supra note 22, para. 101).
69. Id
70. Internal waters are the waters of lakes, rivers, and bays landward of the baseline of the
territorial sea. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, art.
5, pam.1 , U.N. Doe. A/CONF.13/L.52 (1958), 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 210. A coastal state has
full sovereignty over its internal waters, as if they were part of its land territory. L SoHN & K.
GUSTAFSON, THE LAW OF THE SEA 79 (1984).
71. Tunisia/Libya Case, supra note 53, para. 102.
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that the result of closing off the gulf would have been "inappropriate and
inequitable."'72
The Court adopted Libya's position and refused to exclude the
coasts of the Gulf of Gabes from its proportionality calculations. In-
stead, the Court gave due consideration to the special circumstance
presented by the change of direction in the Gulf of Gabes by adjusting
the delimitation line so that it would parallel the general direction of the
Tunisian coast northwest of the Gulf of Gabes. 3
Finally, the Court took into consideration the position of the
Kerkennah Islands. The Court considered that giving full effect to the
Kerkennahs in drawing the delimitation line would have had the inequi-
table effect of cutting off Libya from a portion of the shelf lying in front
of its coast.74 Hence, the Court gave only half-effect to the Kerkennahs
in determining the delimitation line northeast of the Gulf of Gabes.
The resulting ratio between the Libyan and the Tunisian coastlines
was thirty-one to sixty-nine.7 5 The resulting ratio between the area of
-continental shelf appertaining to each was approximately forty to sixty.76
The Court was thus satisfied that its result had met "the requirements of
the test of proportionality as an aspect of equity. '77
Despite these attempts by the Court to clarify and expand on the use
of equitable criteria in maritime boundary delimitations, states remained
incapable of solving their disputes. The pleadings submitted by the
United States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine Case illustrate how the
application of the principles enunciated and the fhctors indicated by the
Court may lead to widely differing results depending on the way in which
those principles are applied, and the relative weight given to each of
those factors in determining the method of delimitation.
M. THE GULF OF MAINE CASE: A SINGLE SOLUTION
TO A TWO-FOLD ISSUE
The only point of agreement between the United States and Canada
in their dispute involved the existence of a "fundamental norm" of cus-
tomary international law.78 According to the United States, the funda-
72. Id. para. 101.
73. Id. paras. 127-128.
74. Id. para. 128; U.S. Memorial, supra note 16, para. 231.
75. Tunisia/Libya Case, supra note 53, para. 131.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Memorial of Canada (Can. v. U.S.), 1982 I.C.J. Pleadings (Gulf of Maine) para. 278
(Sept. 1982) (hereinafter Canadian Memorial].
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mental norm of international law applicable to this case required that
"the delimitation of a single maritime boundary shall be in accordance
with equitable principles, taking account of the relevant circumstances in
the area, to produce an equitable solution."7 9 Likewise, Canada claimed
that, pursuant to the fundamental norm of international law applicable
to this case, "the delimitation of the maritime boundary must be made
according to equitable principles, taking account of all relevant circum-
stances, so as to reach an equitable solution."'8 Naturally, each coun-
try's assessment and application of all the relevant circumstances differed
greatly from those of the other.
A. United States Argument
The United States selected relevant circumstances to be taken into
account when drawing the line of delimitation with a view to acquiring
jurisdiction over the whole of Georges Bank. The relevant circumstances
identified by the United States fell into three categories: the geographical
and geomorphological features in the Gulf of Maine area; the character-
istics of the marine environment; and the activities of the parties in the
area.
81
The United States began by addressing the effect of the geographical
and geomorphological features in the Gulf of Maine on the line of delimi-
tation. The argument focused on three equitable criteria that had been
previously applied in maritime delimitations to abate the effect of geo-
graphical and geomorphological irregularities: the principle of nonen-
croachment; the principle of proportionality; and the principle of natural
prolongation.
The first geographic principle relied on by the United States, the
principle of nonencroachment, demands that any method of delimitation
avoid leaving one state with an area located off, or in front of, the coast of
another.82 In applying the principle of nonencroachment to the present
dispute, the United States pointed out that there is a single general south-
west and northeast direction of the coast in the Gulf of Maine area which
is in accord with the general direction of the east coast of the North
American continent.8 3 Those coasts that follow the general direction of
79. U.S. Memorial, supra note 16, para. 8.
80. Canadian Memorial, supra note 78, para. 278.
81. U.S. Memorial, supra note 16, paras. 278-300.
82. Id para. 240. The principle of nonencroachment was developed in the Grisbardana
Case (Nor. v. Swe.), 1951 I.CJ. 133, a case involving the inshore area adjacent to both the
coasts of Sweden and Norway.
83. Comment, supra note 30, at 271-72.
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the eastern seaboard are primary coasts. The areas directly in front of, or
perpendicular to, primary coasts, prima facie appertain to them. Those
coasts that run contrary to the general direction of the eastern seaboard
are secondary coasts. Secondary coasts "deviate[ ] from the broad geo-
graphical relationship of the parties," and should therefore "not be so
used in the delimitation of [a] single maritime boundary as to deprive [a
state] of the extension of its primary coastal front into the sea." 84
According to the primary-secondary coast argument, Canada's pri-
mary coastal front is the coastline between Cape Sable and Cape Canso
facing the Atlantic Ocean.85 The United States proposed to adjust the
delimitation line it had originally suggested-a straight line perpendicu-
lar to the general direction of the Atlantic coast--so as not to encroach
upon the extension of that front into the Atlantic.8 6 However, the
United States argued that the seaward extension of Canada's secondary
coastal front overlapped with the seaward extension of the U.S. primary
coastal front. Because secondary coasts are entitled to less consideration
than primary coasts, the United States adjusted its perpendicular so as to
leave the greater part of the area of overlap to the United States.87
The U.S. primary coastal front is the coast of Maine abutting on the
Gulf. Since the whole of Georges Bank lies in front of the coast of
Maine, 8 it necessarily follows from the U.S. argument that Georges
Bank would fall entirely within the jurisdiction of the United States.
However, the line originally drawn by the United States in accordance
with the primary coastal front criterion would have infringed the express
clause of the Special Agreement, which provided for a starting point
situated thirty-nine miles from the terminal point of the international
boundary. Accordingly, the United States proposed adjusting the per-
pendicular so as to commence at point A, which still left Georges Bank
entirely within its jurisdiction.
The second geographic principle invoked by the United States was
the principle of proportionality. Like the Federal Republic of Germany
in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the United States claimed that
there must be a strict correlation between the respective lengths of the
coasts of the parties and the sea areas appertaining to them. 9 This argu-
84. U.S. Memorial, supra note 16, para. 309.
85. Id. para. 308.
86. Id.
87. Id. para. 309.
88. Id. para. 310.
89. Id para. 242.
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ment was particularly significant to the United States in view of Canada's
possession of the Bay of Fundy.
The Bay of Fundy is a long, narrow indentation along the Canadian
coast that encloses a very small amount of water. It is bordered on either
side by the coasts of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. It measures
ninety nautical miles in length up to Cape Chignecto, at which point it
divides into two arms: Chignecto Bay and Minas Basin9 ° The total
coastal length of the Bay of Fundy is approximately 180 nautical miles.
By contrast, the bay is fifty-four nautical miles wide at its mouth between
Cape St. Mary's and the coast of Maine, thirty-three nautical miles wide
at St. John, and twenty-five miles wide in its upper reaches.91 The sea
area enclosed by the bay is 3050 square nautical miles, only 11 percent of
the total sea area enclosed by the Gulf of Maine.92 According to the
United States, including the full length of the Bay of Fundy in calculat-
ing the relevant Canadian coastline would have increased the Canadian
coastline by ninety-three percent, while increasing by just seven percent
the sea area appertaining to Canada.
In order to abate this potential inequity, the United States argued
that because the coasts of the Bay of Fundy face only each other, and do
not face the Gulf of Maine area, the Bay should be closed off by a
straight line and not be included in any proportionality test. 93 The
United States argued that the only relevant coastlines were those facing
the Gulf of Maine and the Atlantic Ocean. Measured on this basis, the
length of the U.S. line was 1063 nautical miles, while the Canadian coast-
line was only 692 nautical miles long.9" Thus, the proportion of the U.S.
coastline to the Canadian coastline was sixty-three to thirty-nine.96 At
the same time, the proportion between the maritime area allotted to the
United States and that allotted to Canada by the adjusted perpendicular
line was sixty-one to thirty-seven, respectively.97 Based on these calcula-
tions, the United States claimed that the adjusted perpendicular line it
suggested "achieve[d] a reasonable degree of proportionality between the
90. Counter-Memorial of Canada (Can. v. U.S.), 1983 I.CJ. Pleadings (Gulf of Maine)
para. 129 (June 28, 1983) [hereinafter Canadian Counter-Memorial].
91. Id
92. The total sea area enclosed by the Gulf of Maine measures 28,506 square nautical
miles. For an explanation of the figures used for purposes of the calculations in this Note, see
infra note 234.
93. Counter-Memorial of the United States, 1983 I.CJ. Pleadings (Gulf of Maine) para.
33 (June 28, 1983) [hereinafter U.S. Counter-Memorial].
94. U.S. Memorial, supra note 16, para. 313.
95. Id
96. Id
97. Id
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relevant coastlines and the maritime areas appertaining to each State." 9
(See Appendix 3.)
Finally, the United States turned to the principle of natural prolon-
gation, which is a principle traditionally associated with geomorphology.
Based on the Court's decision in the Tunisia/Libya Case,99 the United
States suggested that the Northeast Channel constituted a break so sig-
nificant in the surface of the continental shelf along the east coast of
North America as to divide the Gulf of Maine area into two separate
continental shelves."1 The United States alternatively argued that even
if the Court did not find evidence sufficient to show that the Northeast
Channel constituted a marked disruption of the area's continental shelf,
the Northeast Channel should at least be recognized as a natural bound-
ary between the ecological regimes of Georges Bank and the Scotian
Shelf. 101 Accordingly, the United States offered to adjust the perpendicu-
lar delimitation line it had originally suggested so as to take into account
the Northeast Channel. The United States proposed to establish a
boundary parallel to the channel and perpendicular to the general direc-
tion of the coast.10 2 Again, the practical result of this adjustment was to
bring Georges Bank entirely within the boundaries of the United States,
while leaving the Scotian Shelf to Canada.
The United States next addressed the effect of the marine environ-
ment of the Gulf of Maine on the delimitation line. The United States
identified three "separate and identifiable ecological regimes" in the Gulf
of Maine area located, respectively, above the Gulf of Maine Basin,
above Georges Bank, and above the Scotian Shelf. 103 The United States
argued that the unity of each of the three ecosystems had to be main-
tained." Preventing the division of state responsibility for identifiable
stocks of fish within each separate ecosystem was crucial for two reasons:
to avoid interference with effective resource conservation and manage-
ment 05 and to minimize the potential for international disputes.' 0 6
98. Id
99. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
100. U.S. Memorial, supra note 16, para. 296.
101. Id. para. 315.
102. Id.
103. Id. paras. 292-293.
104. Id. para. 294.
105. The United States argued that the fish stocks within each ecosystem were independent
of the fish stocks in the other two ecosystems. Consequently, overfishing the stocks associated
with the Scotian shelf would not deplete the stocks of the same species associated with Georges
Bank. However, overfishing of a stock associated with the Georges Bank anywhere on the
Bank would "affect the abundance and even the continued exist-nce of fish of the same stock
throughout its range over Georges Bank." Id.
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In order to avoid dividing the Scotian Shelf and the ecological re-
gime associated with it, the United States proposed to adjust the single
maritime boundary it had originally suggested. 7 The United States
proposed that the two fishing banks on the Scotian Shelf, Browns Bank,
and German Bank be left in their entirety to Canada to avoid inequity.'"
The unarticulated effect of this adjusted perpendicular was to leave
Georges Bank wholly within the jurisdiction of the United States.
The final U.S. argument in its attempt to gain jurisdiction over the
whole of Georges Bank dealt with the activities of the parties in the Gulf
of Maine area. The United States presented extensive documentation in
its brief concerning the supremacy of its claim over Georges Bank. The
United States maintained that, "[e]xcept for occasional foreign vessels,
only the United States fished Georges Bank from colonial days until the
later years of the [International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries] regime."'' 09 The United States provided evidence establishing
the following: it alone had charted and surveyed Browns Bank and
Georges Bank from colonial times until the present; it first provided and
continued to provide aid to navigation; it regularly patrolled Georges
Bank; and it assumed exclusive operational responsibility for the defense
of Georges Bank during World War II.110 The United States enumer-
ated these activities in an attempt to establish its predominant interest in
Georges Bank and the Gulf of Maine, and asserted that this interest had
to be taken into account when delimiting the maritime boundary."I
Finally, the United States argued that article 6 of the 1958 Conti-
nental Shelf Convention was not binding treaty law, even though both
parties had ratified it. The United States reasoned that the Convention
did not apply to the present dispute because it dealt only with delimita-
tion of the continental shelf and not with delimitation of the 200-mile
fishing or other maritime zones." 2
B. The Canadian Argument
Canada, on the other hand, maintained that the law applicable in
this case was article 6 of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention to which
both states were parties. Canada viewed this provision as "the only ex-
106. Id paras. 294, 303.
107. Id para. 303.
108. Id para. 9.
109. Id para. 298.
110. Id para. 299.
111. Id
112. Schneider, supra note 9, at 553.
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plicit source of positive law.., available in this case .... ,,113 Canada
argued that article 6 was a direct source of law for the continental shelf
delimitation and an indirect source of law, by way of analogy, for deter-
mining the 200 mile fishery zone delimitation.114 Accordingly, the line of
delimitation suggested by Canada was an equidistance line, adjusted so as
to take into account the special circumstances of the area.
The circumstances identified by Canada as relevant to the drawing
of the delimitation line were selected with a view to acquiring jurisdiction
over the eastern portion of Georges Bank. Thus, Canada emphasized the
economic rather than the physical characteristics of the Gulf of Maine
area. The only physical circumstance that Canada viewed as sufficiently
irregular to warrant adjustment of the equidistance line was the excep-
tional protrusion of Cape Cod and Nantucket Island.'
Canada took the position that neither geomorphology nor ecology
presented special circumstances worth considering in reaching an equita-
ble result. Canada viewed the continental shelf in the area as a "single,
continuous, uninterrupted feature, without discontinuities that might
identify separate natural prolongations." ' 6 Thus, Canada disagreed
with the U.S. contention that the Northeast Channel constituted a natu-
ral boundary in the continental shelf of the area of delimitation.' 17 More
importantly, Canada rejected the notion that three separate and distinct
ecological regimes were present in the Gulf of Maine area. 118 Rather,
Canada considered Georges Bank as "part of the oceanic continuum,"1'1 9
an "integral part of a single, uninterrupted continental shelf."1 20 Canada
thus implicitly rejected the U.S. argument that division of state responsi-
bility for Georges Bank should be prevented. 21
Canada also refused to adjust the equidistance line in order to abate
the potential inequity created by the length of its coast along the Bay of
Fundy. Canada admitted that the Bay of Fundy attracts a disproportion-
ate "offshore area because of its markedly concave configuration. '122
However, Canada maintained that the overall balance between the Cana-
dian and the U.S. coasts in the Gulf of Maine area "as a whole . . .
113. Canadian Counter-Memorial, supra note 90, para. 548.
114. Id para. 549.
115. Id para. 131.
116. Id. para. 168.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
118. See supra text accompanying note 103.
119. Canadian Counter-Memorial, supra note 90, para. 182.
120. Id. para. 175.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 104-108.
122. Canadian Counter-Memorial, supra note 90, para. 118.
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render[ed] such an abatement unnecessary." 123
Finally, Canada disagreed with the U.S. contention that state activi-
ties in the region constituted a relevant circumstance in effecting the line
of delimitation. Canada regarded state activities as possibly "relevant to
a determination of sovereignty in the territorial sea," 124 but "extraneous
to either the continental shelf or the regime of the exclusive economic
zone .... "125
Instead, Canada claimed that the major relevant circumstance in the
delimitation area was the "economic and human environment" produced
by the gulf's physical characteristics.126 In this context, Canada pointed
out that its fishery on Georges Bank was a "direct consequence" of its
"physical proximity to the resource and lack of alternative employment
opportunities."127 This circumstance gave rise to a greater economic de-
pendency on the resources of Georges Bank on the part of Canada than
on the part of the United States." 8 Thus, the loss of Georges Bank
would have caused "extensive hardship and dislocation" for the people
inhabiting southwest Nova Scotia. 129 Canada therefore argued that
"[e]quity within the law requires appropriate consideration of the eco-
nomic impact on the lives of the people who inhabit the relevant coasts
and whose dependence on the resources of Georges Bank is an estab-
lished fact.' 130
.In line with this reasoning, the only physical characteristic of the
Gulf of Maine area that Canada considered to be relevant in adjusting its
equidistance line was the protrusion of Cape Cod and Nantucket Island
seaward from the general direction of the North American coast. 131
Canada proposed to adjust its otherwise purely equidistant delimitation
line by giving half-effect to the exceptionally long peninsula of Cape Cod
and the islands of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard, pursuant to the
method set forth in the Anglo/French Arbitration. 13 2 According to Can-
ada, discounting Cape Cod and Nantucket as incidental special features
123. Id para. 119. Canada came to this conclusion by employing the system of straight
baselines to measure the coasts of the parties. Using this method, the Canadian coastline mea-
sured 298 nautical miles, while the the United States coast measured 275 nautical miles, a ratio
of 52 to 48. Id para. 140.
124. Canadian Counter-Memorial, supra note 90, para. 590.
125. Id
126. Id. para. 264.
127. Id para. 270.
128. Id para. 13.
129. Id para. 307.
130. Id. para. 304.
131. Id para. 131.
132. See supra text accompanying note 60.
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was essential because a strict application of the equidistance method, giv-
ing the islands full effect, would have allocated to the United States a sea
area eight times larger than the land territory comprised by those is-
lands.' 33 Canada's main concern was that "the area that would be so
allocated to the United States comprised] the rich fishing grounds of
eastern Georges Bank."'134 The obvious result of adjusting the equidis-
tance line by giving half-effect to Cape Cod and Nantucket was to leave
eastern Georges Bank to Canada. (See Appendix 3.)
C. The Chamber's Position
In setting the ground for its own approach to the delimitation, the
Chamber rejected virtually every positive argument made by either party.
The Chamber embraced the U.S. argument in only one respect: that arti-
cle 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, the only
treaty rule in force between the parties, was inapplicable to the delimita-
tion of a single maritime boundary. 135 The Chamber noted that had the
parties sought a delimitation of the continental shelf alone, application of
article 6 would have been mandatory. 136 However, the Chamber was
requested to draw a single delimitation line for both the continental shelf
and the superjacent fishery zone. The provisions of article 6 were there-
fore powerless "as regards a maritime boundary concerning a much
wider subject matter than the continental shelf alone."' 137
The Chamber subsequently attempted to articulate a general rule of
customary international law on continental shelf delimitation as emerg-
ing from previous decisions in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the
Anglo/French Arbitration, and the Tunisia/Libya Case. The Chamber
summarized that rule in one simple sentence: "[F]ailing agreement, the
boundary between States abutting on the same continental shelf is to be
determined on equitable principles."' 1
38
Since the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone, unlike the
delimitation of the continental shelf, had no case precedent at the time,
the Chamber referred to the Convention adopted at the end of the Third
133. Canadian Counter-Memorial, supra note 90, paras. 131-137; see also Comment, Mari-
time Delimitation, supra note 6, at 617. According to Canada's calculations, Cape Cod and
Nantucket comprise a total land area of only 346 square nautical miles, while they would
attract a marine area of 2906 square nautical miles in favor of the United States. Canadian
Counter-Memorial, supra note 90, para. 137.
134. Canadian Counter-Memorial, supra note 90, para. 137.
135. Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 1, para. 125.
136. Id. para. 118.
137. Id. para. 124.
138. Id. para. 92.
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United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Article 74, paragraph
1, provides that "[t]he delimitation of the exclusive economic zone be-
tween states with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agree-
ment on the basis of international law... in order to achieve an equitable
solution." 13 9 The Convention has not been ratified either by the United
States or Canada; thus, article 74 did not bind either party. The Cham-
ber nevertheless viewed article 74 as relevant in pointing out the sinilari-
ties between continental shelf and exclusive economic zone delimitation,
providing legal support for the feasibility of a single maritime delimita-
tion."4 In essence, the Chamber suggested that in the absence of any
applicable treaty law, customary international law could only be ex-
pected to provide "a few legal principles" 141 in the still "new and...
unconsolidated field"142 of maritime delimitation.
The Chamber distinguished between principles and rules of general
customary international law, equitable criteria, and particular methods
of delimitation.14 ' The Chamber's criticisms of the two parties' argu-
ments can thus be classified into two identifiable types. First, the Cham-
ber believed that the parties had been mistaken in seeking to elevate mere
equitable criteria to the status of principles and rules of general custom-
ary international law. The Chamber therefore rejected Canada's claim
that article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf
and the equidistance method were binding rules of international law. 1"
The Chamber also classified the U.S. use of the principles of nonen-
croachment, natural prolongation, and proportionality as attempts to
turn mere equitable criteria into rules of general international law.
139. Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 74, U.N.
Doe. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 LL.M. 1261, 1284 (1982).
140. The parties had not pointed to any rule of international law prescribing or authorizing
the use of a single line to delimit both the continental shelf and the fisheries zone Rather, they
had "simply taken it for granted" that it would be possible "both legally and materially" to
draw a single maritime boundary. Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 1, paras. 26-27; see also
Comment, supra note 30, at 273.
141. Gulf of Maine Case, supra note I, para. 81.
142. Id paras. 150-152.
143. Comment, supra note 30, at 278-79. Neither equitable criteria, nor particular meth-
ods of delimitation have the status of principles or rules of international law. Rather, their
application varies from case to case. Id To illustrate, article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the
Continental Shelf "consists of a 'principle' (that boundaries are to be effected by agreement)
and a 'practical method' (equidistance), whose application will depend upon 'equitable crite-
ria.'" Id at 279.
144. In this respect, the Chamber considered the Canadian position no different from the
unsuccessful Danish argument in the North Sea Cantinental Shelf Cases. However, the Cham-
ber noted that had the dispute centered only on the continental shelf delimitation, article 6
would have been binding as treaty international law, since both parties had ratified the Con-
vention. Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 1, para. 118.
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Second, the Chamber rejected any attempt by either party to apply
any criterion that was exclusively concerned with only one of the "two
natural realities," 4 ' the continental shelf and -the exclusive economic
zone, since both had to be delimited together. Thus, Canada's claim that
article 6 applied to the dispute was castigated a second time as applicable
only to the continental shelf. Likewise, the Chamber discarded the U.S.
geomorphological/ecological argument, including the view of the North-
east Channel as a natural prolongation dividing the gulf into separate
ecologic zones. The Chamber labeled this argument "a criterion and a
method" applicable only to the delimitation of exclusive fishery zones,
and not to the delimitation of the continental shelf.146
The Chamber rejected the U.S. use of a perpendicular to the general
direction of the coastline on the separate ground that the perpendicular
constituted a highly inappropriate method of maritime delimitation in
this particular case. According to the Chamber, the ideal case for the use
of the perpendicular method would be one where the "course of the line
would leave an angle of ninety degrees on either side." 147 The fact that
the starting point of the line to be drawn was located in one of the cor-
ners of the rectangle in which the delimitation was to be effected ren-
dered the Gulf of Maine an especially inappropriate case for the
application of the perpendicular method. The Chamber concluded that
rather than surmount the difficulties of applying the perpendicular
method, the numerous adjustments suggested by the United States only
served to highlight the inadequacy of that method in the case at hand.
Against this background, the Chamber formulated its own version
of the fundamental norm of general international law governing the is-
sues in this case:
(1) No maritime delimitation between states with opposite or adjacent
coasts may be effected unilaterally by one of those states. Such delimi-
tation must be sought and effected by means of an agreement, follow-
ig negotiations conducted in good faith and with the genuine
intention of achieving a positive result. Where, however, such agree-
ment cannot be achieved, delimitation should be effected by recourse
to a third party possessing the necessary competence. (2) In either
case, delimitation is to be effected by the application of equitable crite-
ria and by the use of practical methods capable of ensuring, with re-
gard to the geographic configuration of the area and other relevant
145. Id para. 198.
146. Id. para. 168.
147. Id. para. 176.
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circumstances, an equitable resulL'
This fundamental norm appears to aptly synthesize the dual principle of
general international law announced in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, which applied only to continental shelf delimitation, and article 74
of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which
pertains only to exclusive economic zone delimitation. 14 9 With a grow-
ing number of coastal states extending their exclusive fishery zones pur-
suant to the provisions of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, disputes among coastal states are no longer confined to
continental shelf delimitation. Rather, states are increasingly seeking de-
limitation of both their exclusive fisheries zone and the continental shelf
by means of a single line.150 The principles of international law enunci-
ated in the Gulf of Maine Case were therefore expected to provide the
guidance necessary in such delimitations. Instead, the Chamber's appli-
cation of the fundamental norm "was disappointing to the international
lawyer who hoped to get judicial guidelines of practical significance."' 51
D. Applying the Fundamental Norm
The Chamber stressed that although no particular equitable criteria
or methods were a priori applicable or preferable, preference would
"henceforth inevitably be given to criteria that, because of their... neu-
tral character, are best suited for use in a multi-purpose delimitation."' 15
The only neutral criterion recognized by the Chamber was geography,
considered primarily in its physical aspects. 5 3 The Chamber thus di-
rectly rejected Canada's argument that the socioeconomic consequences
of the physical characteristics of the area of delimitation were relevant
geographic circumstances."5 Within the framework of geography, the
Chamber concluded that it would inevitably favor an equal division of
areas that converged and overlapped.' 55 However, since the Gulf of
Maine area did not present ideal conditions for the application of equal
division, the Chamber found that the following auxiliary criteria should
be taken into account when delimiting the maritime boundary: the com-
parative lengths of the coastlines of the countries concerned; the avoid-
148. Id para. 112.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 138, 139.
150. See, eg., Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Arbitration, supra note 5.
151. Clain, supra note 8, at 525.
152. Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 1, para. 194.
153. Id para. 195.
154. See supra text accompanying note 126-30.
155. Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 1, para. 195.
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ance of cut off and the need to give some effect to nearby islands.1"6 The
Chamber then proceeded to divide the Gulf of Maine area into three
sectors and to draw a line correspondingly divided into three segments.
In the first sector identified by the Chamber, the northeastern sec-
tion of the gulf, the Chamber found that the prevailing relationship of the
coasts of Maine and Nova Scotia was that of lateral adjacency. Hence, in
the absence of any special circumstances, the Chamber considered this to
be the "most appropriate location for effecting as far as possible ... an
equal division" '57 of the area of overlap.
However, the Chamber did not view equal division as synonymous
with the equidistance method. An equidistance line, even if drawn from
undisputed base-points, would have conflicted with the parties' stipula-
tion in the Special Agreement that point A was to be the obligatory point
of departure for the delimitation line. Since point A was not derived
from two base-points of which one was in the unchallenged possession of
the United States and the other in that of Canada, it could not be the
point of departure for an equidistance line. Accordingly, the Chamber
drew a line from point A that bisected the angle formed by lines perpen-
dicular to the line from Cape Elizabeth to the international boundary
terminus, and to the line from Cape Sable to the international boundary
terminus. (See Appendix 4.) The Chamber concluded that this practical
method had the advantage of producing "a result which is probably as
close as possible to an equal division of the first area to be delimited.""',
The Chamber's opinion on the method's other two advantages, namely
its simplicity and its clarity, 159 remains doubtful, since the Chamber did
not establish whether equal division should be effected by use of an equi-
distance line in cases where the parties have not agreed in advance on a
point of departure.
The second sector in the gulf was characterized by the opposite
coasts of Nova Scotia and Massachusetts, in a relationship referred to by
the Chamber as one of "quasi-parallelism."'" The criterion of equal di-
vision in the case of opposite coasts is normally served by the use of a
median line constructed at the midpoint between the opposite coasts and
parallel to their mean direction. However, the Chamber found that the
second sector of the gulf was complicated by the presence of two special
circumstances: the much greater length of the U.S. coastline in the area
156. Comment, supra note 30, at 282.
157. Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 1, para. 209.
158. Id para. 213.
159. Id
160. Id para. 216.
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of delimitation and the presence of Seal Island seaward of the coast of
Nova Scotia.
The second segment of the line was accordingly drawn in two stages.
The first stage entailed the adoption of a provisional line located midway
between the opposite and practically parallel coasts of Massachusetts and
Nova Scotia. 6 ' The second stage in constructing the line consisted of
making adjustments to accommodate the special circumstances and
proved a considerably more complex task than the first segment.
First, the Chamber noted that it was "impossible to disregard the
circumstance" '162 that the relevant coastline of the United States in the
delimitation area was considerably longer than that of Canada. The
Chamber therefore turned to the auxiliary criterion of proportionality to
determine the ratio of the lengths of the U.S. and Canadian coasts, mea-
sured according to simplified coastal lines and not following coastal sinu-
osities. In measuring the length of the Canadian coastline, the Chamber
included the coasts of the Bay of Fundy to the point where "there cease
to be any waters in the bay more distant than twelve miles from a low
water line."' 63 The relevant Canadian coastline was then found to be
approximately 206 nautical miles long. 164 The length of the U.S. rele-
vant coastline was found to measure approximately 284 nautical miles.165
Hence, the ratio of the lengths of the U.S. and Canadian coasts was 1.38
to 1.166 In order to give appropriate weight to the longer U.S. coastline,
the Chamber moved the provisionally adopted median line toward Nova
Scotia to the point on a line drawn across the gulf that reflected the 1.38
to 1 ratio.' 67
The second special circumstance identified by the Chamber in this
sector was the presence of Seal Island. The Chamber considered that
totally disregarding Seal Island in the delimitation would create an ineq-
uitable result, since the island is inhabited year-round, measures some
two and a half miles in length, and is situated only nine miles inside the
closing line of the Gulf of Maine. 6 However, giving the island full ef-
fect would also have created an inequitable result, since that would have
161. Id paras. 216-217.
162. Id para. 218.
163. Id para. 221.
164. Id
165. Id
166. Id para. 222.
167. Id The line was drawn across the gulf from Chebogue Point, Nova Scotia, to the
northeastern tip of Cape Cod, the place where the coasts of Massachusetts and Nova Scotia are
nearest each other.
168. Id
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required treating the coast of Nova Scotia as extending out to, and
across, Seal Island. The Chamber therefore made a third adjustment of
the median line to reflect the fact that the nearest point of land on the
Nova Scotia coast was Seal Island, not Chebogiie point, by giving Seal
Island half-effect. 16 9 This was accomplished by reducing the ratio to be
applied for the purposes of determining the location of the corrected me-
dian line from 1.38 to I to 1.32 to 1.170 Having so determined the place-
ment of this second segment of the boundary, the Chamber then
extended it in two directions, back until it intersected the first segment,
point B, and forward until it intersected the agreed closing line of the
gulf, point C.
The third sector identified by the Chamber concerned the "area
which lies outside and over against the Gulf of Maine."171 Since, from
the geographic point of view, there was no point of reference that could
serve as a basis for delimiting the final segment, the Chamber determined
that construction of the third segment should be effected by reference to
the segments of the line already drawn. The Chamber consequently con-
cluded that the most appropriate method for delimiting the final segment
was the drawing of a perpendicular.172 The third segment would be per-
pendicular to both the general direction of the coastline at the back of the
gulf, as the United States had proposed, and to the closing line, as Can-
ada had suggested.17 3 Thus, the orientation of the last segment would
agree with the orientation both parties had given to the final portion of
the boundary.174
Finally, in determining the point of connection between the perpen-
dicular and the closing line of the Gulf, the Chamber "considered [it]
necessary to remain guided by geography."' 7 Hence, the perpendicular
was to be drawn from point C, the point of intersection of the second
segment and the closing line of the gulf.176 The line was continued until
it intersected with the outer limit of the 200-mile fishing zone of the
United States within the triangle described in the Special Agreement. 177
The third segment, as delimited by the Chamber, divided Georges Bank
so as to give approximately one-sixth of the Bank to Canada, and the rest
169. Id
170. Id
171. Id para. 224.
172. Id
173. Id para. 225.
174. Id.
175. Id. para. 226.
176. Id paras. 226, 229.
177. Id para. 228.
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to the United States.'78 (See Appendix 4.)
E. The Chamber's Assessment of Its Result
In verifying the equitableness of its result, the Chamber focused on
the third segment of the line, since it was that segment that ultimately
divided Georges Bank, the "real subject of the dispute." 179 The Cham-
ber considered only whether the line produced a result that was inequita-
ble in light of the socioeconomic factors presented by the parties." ° The
Chamber determined that the line as constructed passed this test because
it left to Canada the part of Georges Bank containing the greatest con-
centrations of scallops, "the fishery considered by Canada to be of partic-
ular importance to the Nova Scotian community," as well as the areas
where most of its lobster and scallop fishing activities had taken place.18'
At the same time, the line left to the United States the location of its
principal lobster and scallop fishing activities." 2 The Chamber also
noted that each side retained access to "broad expanses" for hydrocarbon
exploration."8 3 The Chamber concluded that "nothing less than a deci-
sion which would have assigned the whole of Georges Bank to one of the
parties might possibly have entailed serious economic repercussions for
the other.""'
The Chamber did not assess the equity of the line as a whole in light
of each particular segment. However, the second segment of the delimi-
tation line was, in the Chamber's own words, "the central and most deci-
sive segment for the whole of the delimitation line."'"" The Chamber
failed to consider that its ultimate apportionment of Georges Bank could
have been influenced by its use of individual equitable criteria in delimit-
ing the second segment of the boundary, and more particularly, by its use
of the auxiliary criterion of proportionality.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Segment 2-An Equitable Result?
The Chamber's delimitation of the second segment (line B-C) was
based on the ratio between coastal lengths. This equitable criterion of
178. Id para. 229.
179. Id para. 168.
180. Id para. 232.
181. Collins & Rogoff, supra note 12, at 31.
182. Id
183. Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 1, para. 239.
184. Id para. 238.
185. Id para. 214.
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proportionality "that 'in certain circumstances, the appropriate conse-
quences may be drawn from any inequalities in the extent of the coasts of
two states in the same area of delimitation'" played a "fundamental role
in the Gulf of Maine decision."18 6 Although the principle of proportion-
ality had previously been applied in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, the Tunisia/Libya Case, and the Anglo/French Arbitration, it was
applied here in a novel way.
B. Previous Applications of the Principle of Proportionality
The principle of proportionality as envisaged by the Court in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases focused on the "reasonable degree of
proportionality... between the extent of the continental shelf appertain-
ing to the states concerned and the length of their respective coast-
lines." ' The Court applied the principle of proportionality to establish
"the necessary balance between states with straight, and those with
markedly concave or convex coasts, or to reduce very irregular coastlines
to their truer proportions."' 8 This application, however, was fairly nar-
row and was therefore of no apparent value to te Gulf of Maine Case.
However, the Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases also
pointed out that its statement of the proportionality principle could be
more generally applied so as to "reduce very inegular coasts to their
truer proportions."'819 It was with an eye to this particular statement
that the United States adopted the proportionality principle in its argu-
ment before the Court.
This position was further supported by the fact that in the Tunisia/
Libya Case, the Court used the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases ap-
proach to proportionality.' 90 The Court in the Tunisia/Libya Case
viewed the proportionality principle as the most important "aspect of
equity."' 91 The Court accordingly used proportionality as a test to assess
the equity of the line it had drawn in the Mediterranean Sea between
Tunisia and Libya. The Court compared the coastline length ratio to the
ratio between the areas of continental shelf apportioned to the parties by
the delimitation line, and was satisfied that the thirty-one to sixty-nine
coastline ratio closely reflected the forty to sixty continental shelf ra-
186. Comment, supra note 30, at 286.
187. North Sea Continental ShelfCases, supra note 22, para. 98.
188. Id
189. Id
190. Collins & Rogoff, supra note 12, at 33 n.158.
191. Tunisia/Libya Case, supra note 53, para. 131.
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tio.192 The Court thus affirmed the principle announced in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases that equity requires a "reasonable degree of pro-
portionality" between the respective continental shelf areas and the
length of the respective coasts measured by the general direction of the
coastlines.
The principle of proportionality was given a different twist in the
Anglo/French Arbitration. The Court of Arbitration explained its view of
the function of proportionality in the following terms:
The equitable delimitation of the continental shelf is not.., a question
of apportioning-sharing out-the continental shelf amongst the
States abutting upon it. Nor is it a question of simply assigning to
them areas of the shelf in proportion to the length of their coastlines;
for to do this would be to substitute for the delimitation of boundaries
a distributive apportionment of shares .... [T]here can never be a
question of completely refashioning nature ... ; it is rather a question
of remedying the disproportionality and inequitable effects produced
by particular geographical configurations or features in situations
where otherwise the appurtenance of roughly comparable attributions
of continental shelf to each State would be indicated by the geographi-
cal facts.19
3
The Court of Arbitration thus emphasized the necessity to abate dis-
parities between coastal configurations, not lengths. Accordingly, the
Court of Arbitration made no attempt to measure the lengths of the Brit-
ish and French coasts that bordered on the delimitation area in order to
determine their relationship to the open-ended area of continental shelf
to be divided. Instead, the Court of Arbitration applied the proportion-
ality concept to assess "whether the geographical situation of the Scilly
Isles in relation to the French coast ha[d] a distorting effect and [wa]s a
cause of inequity as between the United Kingdom and the French Re-
public."' 94 The principle of proportionality was used to give the Scilly
Isles only half-effect, 195 and thus to abate "the disproportionate effects of
a considerable projection on to the Atlantic continental shelf of a some-
what attenuated portion of the coast of the United Kingdom."'' 96
C. The Chamber's Novel Use of the Principle of Proportionality
The Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case did not use the principle of
192. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
193. Anglo/French Arbitration, supra note 52, pam. 101.
194. Id para. 250.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
196. Anglo/French Arbitration, supra note 52, paras. 248-251.
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proportionality in either of the ways it had previously been applied. The
Chamber failed to identify the Bay of Fundy as an unusual geographic
feature capable of producing a distorting effect on the line the Chamber
had drawn, as had been accomplished in the Anglo/French Arbitration.
The Chamber also failed to compare the ratios of coastline lengths to the
ratios of the maritime areas appertaining to the two states. Instead, the
Chamber simply noted the substantial difference in the lengths of the
relevant coastlines of the parties, determined the ratio of those lengths,
and then moved the median line provisionally established for the crucial
second segment of the boundary line to bring it in accord with that ra-
tio. 97 Thus, the Chamber did not use the proportionality principle in
order to test the equitableness of its result, as the Court had done in the
Tunisia/Libya Case. The Chamber thereby implicitly demoted the pro-
portionality principle from its previous position as "touchstone of equita-
bleness" 198 to one of mere auxiliary criterion. The Chamber's errors in
departing from past uses of the principle of proportionality are reflected
in its treatment of and solution to the Bay of Fundy issue.
V. THE BAY OF FUNDY
A. The United States Application of the Principle of Proportionality
The U.S. interpretation of the proportionality principle took into ac-
count both of its previous uses. As in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases and the Tunisia/Libya Case, the United States argued that the pro-
portionality principle required "that a delimitation take account of the
relationship between the extent of the maritime area appertaining to the
States concerned and the lengths of their respective coastlines." 99 In the
Anglo/French Arbitration, the United States also regarded proportional-
ity as "the criterion by which it may be determined whether individual
geographic features so distort the course of a boundary as to result in a
delimitation that is not in consonance with the cardinal principle that a
boundary be delimited in accordance with equitable principles."200 Both
of these views were correctly identified by the United States in its discus-
sion on the use of proportionality as an equitable principle. However, the
United States failed to bring in those views in support of the specific issue
concerning whether or not the coasts of the Bay of Fundy should be
included in any proportionality test. The United States simply argued
197. Id.
198. Tunisia/Libya Case, supra note 53, para. 108.
199. U.S. Memorial, supra note 16, para. 242.
200. Id para. 244.
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that since the "coastlines of the Bay of Fundy face each other and not the
area being delimited... it is not appropriate to include the length of the
coastline within the Bay of Fundy in a coastline calculation for purposes
of the proportionality test."20 1 The United States consequently suggested
that the Bay of Fundy be closed, with the length of the closing line across
the mouth of the Bay of Fundy included in the calculation of the length
of the relevant Canadian coastline.0
The reasoning behind the U.S. position on the proportionality test
follows most logically from its earlier argument in favor of the principle
of nonencroachment. The United States had suggested that there was a
"single general direction of the coast in the Gulf of Maine area." 2°a
Coasts that followed this general direction were primary coasts and were
consequently entitled to the areas in front of them.' Coasts that ran
contrary to the general direction were secondary coasts and were there-
fore entitled to less consideration." 5 As a natural extension of this argu-
ment, the United States claimed that coasts not facing the Gulf of Maine
at all, such as those of the Bay of Fundy, were entitled to no considera-
tion at all.
Whatever the legal value of the primary-secondary coasts argument
to the principle of nonencroachment, the extension of the argument to
the principle of proportionality was inappropriate. Each equitable prin-
ciple must have a separate justification in law. That the United States
needed to use the reasoning behind one principle to support another un-
masks the void behind its argument: that no justification existed under
international law for the proposition that where two coastal fronts only
face each other, and not the area of delimitation, they should be excluded
from any calculation for purposes of the proportionality test. The United
States could have attempted to rebut this accusation by pointing out that
no case before the Gulf of Maine Case had presented a feature similar to
the Bay of Fundy, namely a bay within a larger gulf. However, the Gulf
of Gabes in the Tunisia/Libya Case was precisely a bay within a larger
gulf. Yet, neither party in that case claimed that the Gulf of Gabes
should be sealed off because its coasts faced only each other and not the
rest of the area to be delimited. The lack of such an argument in that
case should have indicated to the United States that the fact that the
coasts of a bay face only each other does not of itself constitute a distor-
201. U.S. Counter-Memorial, supra note 93, para. 307.
202. Mra
203. Comment, supra note 30, at 271.
204. Id. at 271-272.
205. Id; see also supra text accompanying note 84.
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tion of the entire coast of a state. That claim was simply a conclusion,
not supported by law. Disguised as reasoning, it was offered as justifica-
tion for the only valid U.S. conclusion concerning the Bay of Fundy,
namely that the Bay of Fundy was a geographical aberration in the area
of the Gulf of Maine.
B. The United States Solution
In light of its erroneous argument, the suggested U.S. solution,
namely complete exclusion of the Bay of Fundy coastline from its calcu-
lation of proportionality, was unacceptable. First, sealing off the Bay of
Fundy was inconsistent with the U.S. position regarding the full area of
delimitation. As the Canadian briefs astutely pointed out, the United
States used the change in direction of the Canadian coast at the head of
the Bay of Fundy as the rationale for determining the limits of the area in
which the proportionality test would be used.206 However, "the very
coasts which comprise[d] this geographical feature [we]re excluded from
the test."
'20 7
In addition, closing off the Bay of Fundy for purposes of the propor-
tionality test was as inequitable as the Chamber's taking into account
almost all of the bay's coastline. The U.S. solution essentially ignored
the bay's existence, and thus ignored geographic reality. The Court in
the North Sea Continental Shef Cases and the Court of Arbitration in the
Anglo/French Arbitration both stressed that "[j]ust as it is not the func-
tion of equity.., completely to refashion geography, so it is also not the
function of equity to create a situation of complete equity where nature
and geography have established an inequity."20 The solutions adopted
by the courts in the two cases did not purport to ignore or exclude geo-
graphical aberrations, but to "reduce very irregular coasts to their truer
proportions,' 20 9 or to abate the disproportionate effects of aberrational
features.2 10
C. The Chamber's View
The Chamber interpreted the U.S. argument to mean that where the
opposite coasts of a bay belong to the same state, they should not be
regarded as part of the larger gulf onto which they open.21 The Chain-
206. Canadian Counter-Memorial, supra note 90, para. 670.
207. Id.
208. Anglo/French Arbitration, supra note 52, para. 249.
209. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 22, para. 98.
210. Anglo/French Arbitration, supra note 52, para. 249.
211. Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 1, para. 221.
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ber considered and dismissed as a possible justification for this position
an analogy between the Bay of Fundy and the Gulf of Gabes in the Tuni-
sia/Libya Case. Specifically, the Chamber noted that in the Tunisia/
Libya Case the Court included the Gulf of Gabes in its calculation of the
length of the Tunisian coast despite the fact that the gulf's coasts were
wholly Tunisian.2 12
The Chamber erred in its assessment of the U.S. argument as well as
its reasoning. First, the United States did not explicitly argue that the
coasts of the Bay of Fundy should be excluded because they both belong
to Canada. Although an equation can certainly be made in this particu-
lar case between the coasts of the bay facing each other and the coasts
belonging to the same state, the United States did not seek to make that
equation. The United States stressed the fact that the coasts of the Bay
of Fundy oppose each other in order to highlight the fact that they do
not face the rest of the gulf, and thus are an aberration from the general
configuration of the area.
The Chamber misconceived the U.S. argument by overinterpreting
its first premise that the coasts face each other, and by overlooking its
second, that they do not face the area to be delimited. These two prem-
ises are not simply restatements of the same idea. They each have indi-
vidual importance in leading to the U.S. conclusion that the coasts
should be excluded. The Chamber interpreted the U.S. argument that
"[t]he coasts of the Bay of Fundy face each other and not the area to be
delimited, therefore they should be excluded as a geographical aberra-
tion," to mean that "[t]he coasts of the Bay of Fundy both belong to
Canada, therefore they should be excluded."
The Chamber's assessment of the possible U.S. reasoning was also
faulty in two respects. In drawing an analogy between the Bay of Fundy
and the Gulf of Gabes in the Tunisia/Libya Case, the Chamber ignored
the differences in both the legal issues and the geographical configura-
tions involved in the two cases. The only point shared by the two situa-
tions was the desire on the part of the United States and Tunisia to have
the Bay of Fundy and the Gulf of Gabes, respectively, closed off by a
straight line from the broader gulfs onto which they open. Neither bay
was to be included in any proportionality test. Tunisia, however, claimed
that the Gulf of Gabes should not be part of the area of delimitation
because it was an historic bay and thus was entirely within its jurisdic-
tion. The Court held that the "legal status of the waters off the coast in
question is not a relevant factor when deciding whether these coasts
212. Id
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should be included ... for the purpose of the proportionality test. 21 3
The Court did not address either the issue of whether coasts of a bay
belonging to a single state, or whether coasts facing each other and not
the area to be delimited, should be included for the purpose of the pro-
portionality test.
Had the same legal arguments been involved in both cases, the anal-
ogy would still have been imperfect for geographic reasons. (See Appen-
dix 5.) The Bay of Fundy is long and narrow. It extends ninety nautical
miles inland and measures as little as twenty-five nautical miles in its
upper reaches.2 14 Its coastline changes direction three times: twice at its
northern end and once at its mouth.215 The Gulf of Gabes measures
forty nautical miles across its mouth216 and extends only forty-nine nau-
tical miles inland.21 It changes direction only once, at its most westerly
point.218  The ratio of the very long coasts of the Bay of Fundy to the
relatively small water area enclosed would have substantially affected the
ratio of coast to water in the entire Gulf of Maine area. In the Gulf of
Gabes, on the other hand, the extent of the gulf's coastline and sea area
enclosed are in relative equilibrium. Therefore, it would not have mat-
tered much whether the Gulf of Gabes was included or excluded from
any proportionality test.219  The Court's refusal in the Tunisia/Libya
Case to close off the Gulf of Gabes gives little support to the Chamber's
refusal in this case to close off the Bay of Fundy. Any implication by the
Chamber that the U.S. reasoning was based on similar reasoning by Tu-
nisia in the Tunisia/Libya Case was simply unfounded.220 Tunisia made
213. Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine
Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 354 (Separate Opinion of Judge Schwebel) [hereinafter Sepa-
rate Opinion of Judge Schwebel].
214. Canadian Counter-Memorial, supra note 90, para. 129.
215. U.S. Memorial, supra note 16, para. 287.
216. Memorial of Libya (Tun. v. Lib. Arab. Jamahiriya), 1975) I.C.J. Pleadings (Case Con-
cerning the Continental Shelf) para. 137. The closing line of the gulf is 46 miles in length. One
mile measures 5280 feet, while one nautical mile measures 6076 feet. Therefore, 46 miles
equals 39.97 (40) nautical miles.
217. Memorial of Tunisia (Tun. v. Lib. Arab. Jamahiriya), 1979 I.C.J. Pleadings (Case
Concerning the Continental Shelf) para. 3.14. The gulf extends 90 kilometers inland. One
kilometer equals 0.61237 miles. Therefore, 90 kilometers equal 56.25 miles, or 48.88 (49) nau-
tical miles.
218. Tunisia/Libya Case, supra note 53, para. 128.
219. Separate Opinion of Judge Schwebel, supra note 213, at 356.
220. The United States noted that it had "always reserved its position" with respect to
Canada's "inchoate claim that the Bay of Fundy constitutes historic or internal waters," Re-
ply of the United States (Can. v. U.S.), 1983 I.C.J. Pleadings (Gulf of Maine) 154 n.4 (Dec. 12,
1983) [hereinafter U.S. Reply]. However, Tunisia had argued that the Gulf of Gabes be closed
off by a straight line precisely because the waters enclosed by the gulf were "internal waters."
See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
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neither of the U.S. claims; it did not argue that the Gulf of Gabes should
be excluded from the proportionality test because all of its coastline be-
longed to it, or that the Gulf of Gabes constituted a geographical
aberration.
D. The Chamber's Solution
The Chamber's solution to the Bay of Fundy issue was to hold that
the coasts of the Bay of Fundy should be included up to the point where
the bay so narrows that it contains "only maritime areas lying no further
than twelve miles from the low water mark."'" The Chamber offered no
reasoning for this decision.' Purportedly, the twelve mile limit that the
Chamber set for purposes of calculating the coastal length of the Bay of
Fundy was the Canadian twelve mile territorial sea limit. The coasts of
the Bay of Fundy were consequently to be calculated from the starting
point of the high seas within the bay.' In this respect, the Chamber's
holding can be defeated by the very tool it used to dismiss the U.S. argu-
ment: the decision of the Court in the Tunisia/Libya Case that "the legal
status of the waters off the coast in question is not a relevant factor when
deciding whether or not these coasts should be included in the calcula-
tion of coast-ratios for the purpose of the proportionality test." 4 More
important, calculation of the coastal length of the Bay of Fundy up to
twelve miles from the low water mark gave the bay almost full effect. In
view of the disproportionate effect of the ratio of coast to water in the
Bay of Fundy" 5 on the ratio of coast to water in the entire Gulf of Maine
area,2 6 the Chamber counted so much of the bay's coastline as to create
an inequity.
221. Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 1, para. 31.
222. Separate Opinion of Judge Schwebel, supra note 213, at 354.
223. According to this method, the Canadian coastline along the Bay of Fundy was found
to measure 143 nautical miles. See Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Bound-
ary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 348, para. 6 (Technical Report)
[hereinafter Technical Report].
224. Separate Opinion of Judge Schwebel, supra note 213, at 354.
225. The ratio is 1 to 14.6, with the length of the Bay of Fundy coastline measuring 209
nautical miles and the sea area enclosed by the bay measuring 3050 square nautical miles. For
an explanation of how these figures were obtained, see infra note 234.
226. The ratio is 1 to 323.4, with the length of the Canadian coastline in the Gulf of Maine
area as a whole measuring 341 nautical miles, and the total sea area in the Gulf of Maine area
as a whole measuring 110,278 square nautical miles. These figures are derived from Figure
51A of the Canadian Memorial. For further explanation on the figures used for purposes of
this Note, see infra note 234.
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E. Judge Schwebel's Solution
In a concurring opinion to the Gulf of Maine Case, Judge Schwebel
reached a position midway between that of the United States and that of
the Chamber. Judge Schwebel attempted to correct the disproportionate
ratio of coast to water in the Bay of Fundy in light of the notion of
"abatement" as expressed in the Anglo/French Arbitration. In fact,
Judge Schwebel used language borrowed from the Anglo/French Arbitra-
tion to make his point. "[T]he Fundy coasts should, in a calculation of
proportionality, be abated .... [T]o do otherwise and to give full weight
to a feature which in this case is so distorting in a calculation of propor-
tionality would be inequitable." '227 The judge accordingly suggested that
Canada be credited in a calculation of proportionality with the coastlines
of the Bay of Fundy up to Saint John, that is, up to "the farthest reach of
the Fundy coast facing the Gulf of Maine." '228 By taking into account
only half the coast of the Bay of Fundy, the judge attempted to cancel the
doubling effect created by the fact that the bay's coasts face each other
and to balance the ratio of coast to water in the bay. This restricted
measurement of the coastlines of the Bay of Fundy would have resulted
in moving the delimitation line a distance of ten nautical miles to the
northeast, in favor of the United States.229 (See Appendix 6.)
Judge Schwebel's solution is inadequate for several reasons. First,
the solution is somewhat arbitrary. Although it is certainly true that
reducing the coastline of the Bay of Fundy by half diminishes the dispro-
portionate coast to water ratio in the bay, there is no indication that it
reduces the ratio to its true proportions. Second, like the U.S. argument,
the Judge's suggestion ignores geographic reality. One cannot simply
overlook the fact that just as the coast of the Bay of Fundy extends as far
as Saint John to the northeast, it also descends back down on the other
side. Again, the principle enunciated by the Court in previous cases ap-
plies: that the function of equity is not to refashion geography but to
abate the inequities created by it. Finally, it should be noted that the
method of giving half-effect to islands is not to be taken literally. The
measure by which the position of the Scilly Isles increased the length of
the British coastline by projecting it onto the Atlantic continental shelf
was not simply halved by the Court, but was reduced according to a
more complex formula.230
227. Separate Opinion of Judge Schwebel, supra note 213, at 356.
228. Id. at 355.
229. Clain, supra note 8, at 584.
230. See supra text accompanying note 60.
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VI. PROPOSAL
The author of this Note agrees with the U.S. and Judge Schwebel's
position that the Bay of Fundy constitutes an aberrational geographic
feature in the Gulf of Maine whose effect on the calculation of the Cana-
dian coastline for purposes of the proportionality test should have been
abated. However, because the U.S. nonencroachment argument failed to
adequately support its position," 1 the Chamber entirely dismissed the
U.S. argument with respect to the Bay of Fundy. In order to have made
a more effective and convincing argument, the United States should have
specifically applied to its calculation of the Bay of Fundy coastline the
principles of proportionality it had identified in its general discussion of
the use of proportionality.3 2 The United States would then have had the
support of two powerful lines of reasoning that the Chamber could not
lightly have disregarded: that of the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
and the Tunisia/Libya Case on the one hand, and that of the Anglo!
French Arbitration on the other.
The United States began to make what seemed like a proportionality
argument by noting that the length of the coasts of the Bay of Fundy is
greatly disproportionate to the area of water they comprehend. 233 In-
deed, while the coastline of the Bay of Fundy measures approximately
209 nautical miles (38 percent of the total coastal length in the Gulf of
Maine), the area of water it encloses is only 3050 square nautical miles
(only 11 percent of the sea area inside the gulf).3 Thus, the United
231. See supra text accompanying notes 202-06.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 199-201.
233. See U.S. Reply, supra note 220, para. 267.
234. All the calculations made for purposes of this Note are based on the figures in Figure
51A of the Canadian Counter-Memorial, supra note 90, at pages 158 and 161 of the Reply of
Canada (Can. v. U.S.), 1983 I.CJ. Pleadings (Gulf of Maine) (Dec. 12, 1983) [hereinafter
Canadian Reply], and at page 155 of the U.S. Reply, supra note 220, all of which are consistent
with each other.
The figure for the area of water enclosed by the Bay of Fundy was calculated as follows.
The United States claimed that the sea area of the Bay of Fundy increases by only seven
percent the sea area appertaining to Canada in Figure 51A of the Canadian Counter-Memo-
rial. U.S. Reply, supra note 220, para. 267. Assuming that the figure to which the United
States alluded was the figure reflecting the total sea area appertaining to Canada, namely
46,621 square nautical miles, the area of water in the Bay of Fundy is found to measure 3050
square nautical miles.
The length of the coastline of the Bay of Fundy to Cape St. Mary's was calculated as
follows. According to Figure 51A, the total Canadian coastal length inside the Gulf of Maine,
Le. to Cape Sable, measures 258 nautical miles. The distance between Cape St. Mary's and
Cape Sable measures 49 nautical miles. Canadian Counter-Memorial, supra note 90, at 58
n.86. The length of the Bay of Fundy's coastline to St. Mary's is thus 258 nautical miles minus
49 nautical miles, or 209 nautical miles.
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States accurately concluded that the bay's "long coasts and relatively
small water area... affect[ed] materially the ratio of coast-to-water in
the area. '235 Specifically, inclusion of the Bay of Fundy's full coastline
for purposes of the proportionality test increases the Canadian coast by
up to three times its length,236 but increases the total sea area appertain-
ing to Canada by as much as fifteen times.237 In light of these findings,
the United States should have followed its argument through by invoking
the principle of proportionality as enunciated in the North Sea Continen-
tal Shelf Cases and in the Tunisia/Libya Case: equity requires that there
be a "reasonable degree of proportionality... between the extent of the
continental shelf appertaining to the States concerned and the length of
their respective coastlines. ' 23 The United States could then have con-
cluded that in order to comply with that principle, the "exaggeration of
the consequences" of the Bay of Fundy had to be "remedied or compen-
sated for as far as possible, being itself creative of inequity. 2 39 Instead,
the United States sought to exclude the bay's coastline from the propor-
tionality test based on the wholly unrelated principle of
nonencroachment. 24
The United States should also have relied on the principle enunci-
ated in the Anglo/French Arbitration that proportionality expresses the
"criterion or factor by which it may be determined" whether "particular
configurations of the coast... may, under certain conditions, distort the
course of the boundary" and thus result "in an inequitable delimitation
of the continental shelf as between the coastal States concerned."' 241 As
discussed earlier, the Court of Arbitration identified the position of the
Scilly Isles twenty-one miles off the coast of Britain as an aberrational
configuration capable, absent correction by the Court, of distorting the
line of delimitation and of creating an inequitable result. The Bay of
Fundy was comparable to the Scilly Isles. Although different geographi-
cal configurations, the first being a bay and the second being a group of
islands, both were attenuated features that had the potential of increasing
the coastline of the state to which they appertained by a disproportionate
amount. The mere position of the Scilly Isles could potentially increase
the length of the British coastline between the British mainland and the
Atlantic to twice the length of the French coastline between the French
235. U.S. Reply, supra note 220, para. 267.
236. See id
237. See Canadian Counter-Memorial, supra note 90, Figure 51A.
238. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 22, para. 98.
239. Id at 49.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 202-03.
241. Anglo/French Arbitration, supra note 52, para. 100.
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mainland and the Atlantic to the island of Ushant. Similarly, the Bay of
Fundy, which comprises only seven percent of the area of water of the
Gulf of Maine, could potentially increase the Canadian coastline length
by ninety-three percent.242 The United States should have argued that
giving full weight to the Bay of Fundy would, as in the Anglo/French
Arbitration, so distort any calculation of proportionality that the result-
ing line of delimitation would be inequitable.
Although the United States failed to make these arguments in its
pleading, the Chamber could and should have made those arguments on
its own. Instead, in rejecting the U.S. arguments with respect to exclud-
ing the coasts of the Bay of Fundy from the proportionality test, the
Chamber rejected altogether the position that the Bay of Fundy consti-
tutes an aberrational feature in the Gulf of Maine area. Consequently,
the Chamber refused to suggest a formula or a method by means of
which the coasts on the Bay of Fundy could have been reduced so as to
abate their exaggerated effect on calculating the total Canadian coastline
for the proportionality test.
In view of the proportionality principles announced in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases, the Anglo/French Arbitration, and the Tunisia!
Libya Case, the United States or, alternatively, the Chamber should have
suggested the following method of delimiting the length of the coasts of
the Bay of Fundy in order to remedy their disproportionate effect: the
length of the coast of the Bay of Fundy should be multiplied by a median
between the ratio of the sea area in the Bay of Fundy to the sea area in
the inner area of the Gulf of Maine and the ratio of the Bay of Fundy's
coastal length to the total length of the coastline in the inner area of the
gulf. Translated into numerical terms, the resulting formula would be:
( 3050SNM + 209NM)
209NM X 28506SNM 544NM = 51NM 243
2
The length of the coast of the Bay of Fundy obtained by this means
coincides with the length of the closing line that the United States sug-
gested drawing across the mouth of the bay from the international
boundary terminus to Cape St. Mary's.2 " Substituting this adjusted
242. See U.S. Reply, supra note 220, para. 267.
243. NM stands for nautical miles. SNM stands for square nautical miles. All the figures
used in this calculation reflect the length of the coastlines and the area of water in what
Canada designated as the "inner area" of the Gulf of Maine. Canadian Counter-Memorial,
supra note 90, Figure 51A.
244. Canadian Reply, supra note 234, para. 363. However, this does not mean that the
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length of the Bay of Fundy for the length Canada had originally calcu-
lated, the full Canadian coastline in the inner area of the Gulf of Maine
area measures one hundred miles.245 The ratio between the Canadian
and the U.S. coastlines in the inner area of the gulf thus increases from
forty-seven to fifty-three respectively, to twenty-six to seventy-four. Sub-
stituting the fifty-one nautical miles for the one hundred forty-five nauti-
cal miles in the Chamber's calculations, the full Canadian coastline in
the inner area of the Gulf of Maine measures 111.9 (112) nautical
miles 46 The ratio between the Canadian and the U.S. coastlines in the
inner area of the gulf accordingly changes from 1 to 1.38 to 1 to 2.54.
Since the 1 to 1.38 ratio, even after being adjusted to 1 to 1.32, resulted in
awarding Canada one-sixth of Georges Bank, 47 the 1 to 2.54 ratio would
have necessitated adjusting the Chamber's delimitation line so as to in-
clude all of Georges Bank within the jurisdiction of the United States.
However, although the method of delimitation put forth by this Note
accomplishes the same effect as the method of closing off the Bay of
Fundy by a straight line, the method suggested here conforms to the
principles of proportionality announced in previous international mari-
time boundary adjudications. At the same time, the formula is free from
the inconsistencies of the U.S. suggestion.
First, the method of delimitation proposed here balances the ratio
between the coastal length of the aberrational configuration and the total
length of the coast in the area of delimitation, and the ratio between the
sea area appertaining to the aberrational configuration and the total sea
area in the area of delimitation. The formula therefore respects the prin-
ciple announced in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases that equity
requires a "reasonable degree of proportionality" between coastline
length and the sea area appertaining to it.
In addition, the formula suggested here constitutes an abatement of
the exaggerated effect created by the disproportionate ratio of coast to
water in the Bay of Fundy on the calculation of the Canadian coastline.
It does so by emphasizing the insignificance of the area of water enclosed
by the Bay of Fundy relative to the water area of the rest of the Gulf.
formula suggested here will always reduce the coasts of a long, narrow bay to the length of a
closing fine drawn across its mouth. The fact that this result was reached here is purely
coincidental.
245. The coastline from Cape St. Mary's to Cape Sable measures 49 nautical miles.
246. See Technical Report, supra note 223, at 348, para. 6. The distance from Brier Island
to Cape Sable was found to measure 60.9 nautical miles. Id.
247. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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The formula thus respects the holding of the Court of Arbitration in the
Anglo/French Arbitration.
Unlike the solutions proposed by the United States and by Judge
Schwebel, the formula suggested here does not ignore geographic reality.
The formula neither pretends that the Bay of Fundy does not exist, nor
that it extends only half way. Rather, the formula takes into account the
full coastline of the Bay of Fundy and abates its effect by bringing the bay
to its true proportion in relation to the Gulf of Maine, instead of refash-
ioning its geographical configuration. Had the United States proposed
this formula, it could have avoided the use of inconsistent arguments,
alternatively including the coasts of the Bay of Fundy for the sake of
some arguments, and excluding them for the sake of others.
Finally, the formula proposed here has universal application. It can
be applied as a proportionality criterion in any situation that presents a
configuration similar to that of the Gulf of Maine.
VII. CONCLUSION
In delimiting the maritime boundary between the United States and
Canada in the Gulf of Maine area, the Chamber purported to use equita-
ble criteria and "practical methods capable of ensuring, with regard to
the geographic configuration of the area... an equitable result."'248 For
the United States, the Chamber's equitable result meant "losing 'the best
50 miles of Georges Bank.' ,249 For the development of international
law in the area of equity and maritime boundary delimitations, the
Chamber's result meant a radical departure from previous uses of equita-
ble criteria with potential negative repercussions for future disputes.
The only geographic circumstance that the Chamber found impossi-
ble to disregard was that the relevant coastline of the United States in the
delimitation area was considerably longer than that of Canada.2' ° The
Chamber then used the principle of proportionality only to determine the
ratio of the lengths of the United States and Canadian coasts, ignoring
the geographical aberration presented by the disproportionate ratio of
coast to water in the Bay of Fundy.
The Chamber also ignored the classic use of proportionality as a test
of equity, to maintain equilibrium between the coastlines of states and
the sea areas appertaining to them. Instead, the only factor the Chamber
248. Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 1, para. 112.
249. Clain, supra note 8, at 606 (citing The Chronicle Herald (Halifax), Oct. 22, 1984, at 3,
col. 1).
250. Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 1, para. 184.
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considered in assessing the equitableness of its result was economics.
The Chamber thus refused to give effect to the distortion created by the
disproportionate ratio of coast to water in the Bay of Fundy in the
Chamber's calculation of the relevant Canadian coastline. The Cham-
ber's construction of the second segment gave almost full weight to the
coasts of the Bay of Fundy and consequently gave Canada a larger area
of water and of continental shelf than was equitable.
The danger of the Chamber's departure from the use of proportion-
ality as a test of equitableness has already been abated. In the Guineal
Guinea-Bissau Arbitration, the only case concerning simultaneous delimi-
tation of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone since the Gulf
of Maine Case, the Court of Arbitration refused to consider the effect of
economic factors on its final delimitation line.25' The Tribunal specifi-
cally dismissed the Chamber's socioeconomic test by noting that:
The fact is that the Tribunal does not have the power to compensate
for the economic inequalities of the States concerned by modifying a
delimitation which it considers is called for by objective and certain
considerations. Neither can it take into consideration the fact that eco-
nomic circumstances may lead to one of the Parties being favored to
the detriment of the other where this delimitation is concerned.25 2
The main objective and certain consideration that the Tribunal took into
account was the "proportionality... between the length of the coastline
and the surface area of the zone to be attributed to each state.''25 3 Thus,
the development of equity in the area of international maritime adjudica-
tions already evidences a rejection of the equitable criteria used in the
Gulf of Maine Case and a return to the principles announced in the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases and in the Tunisia/Libya Case.
However, the Chamber's refusal to treat the Bay of Fundy as a geo-
graphic aberration for purposes of the proportionality test has not yet
been addressed. The Chamber's failure to deal with this important issue
could be interpreted as signifying that arguments such as the one ad-
vanced by the United States will automatically fail in future negotiations.
The Chamber's treatment of what seems to have been a justified claim is
certain to become a source of future inequitable results. By offering
states an alternative line of reasoning for such claims, the formula pro-
posed here may avoid such an outcome.
251. Guinea/Guinea-Bssau Arbitration, supra note 5, para. 123.
252. Id.
253. Id para. 120.
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Appendix 1
Reprinted from Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
Maine Area (Canada v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 285 (Judgment of Oct. 12),
with permission.
LIMITS OF FISHERY ZONES AND CONTINENTAL SHELF CLAIMED BY
THE PARTIES IN MARCH 1977
United States line-------
Canadian line ........
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Reprinted from Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
Maine Area (Canada v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 269 (Judgment of Oct. 12),
with permission.
THE STARTING POINT FOR THE DELIMITATION LINE AND THE AREA
FOR ITS TERMINATION
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Appendix 3
Reprinted from Delimitatiofi of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
MaineArea (Canada v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 289 (Judgment of Oct. 12),
with permission.
(ADjUSTED) DELIMITATION LINES PROPOSED BY THE PARTIES BEFORE
THE CHAMBER
United States line-------
Canadian line ........
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A
Reprinted from Counter-Memorial of Canada (Canada v. U.S.), 1983
I.C.J. Pleadings (Gulf of Maine) (June 28, 1983).
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Appendix 6
Reprinted from Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
Maine Area (Canada v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 359 (Judgment of Oct. 12),
with permission.
REFERRED TO IN THE SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE SCHWEBEL
Chamber's line
Judge Schwebel's line
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